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Abstract. The paper addresses the problem of emulating a regular register in a
synchronous distributed system where clients invoking read() and write() oper-
ations are anonymous while server processes maintaining the state of the register
may be compromised by rational adversaries (i.e., a server might behave as ratio-
nal malicious Byzantine process). We first model our problem as a Bayesian game
between a client and a rational malicious server where the equilibrium depends
on the decisions of the malicious server (behave correctly and not be detected
by clients vs returning a wrong register value to clients with the risk of being
detected and then excluded by the computation). We prove such equilibrium ex-
ists and finally we design a protocol implementing the regular register that forces
the rational malicious server to behave correctly. Keywords: Regular Register,
Rational Malicious Processes, Anonymity, Bayesian Game.
1 Introduction
To ensure high service availability, storage services are usually realized by replicating
data at multiple locations and maintaining such data consistent. Thus, replicated servers
represent today an attractive target for attackers that may try to compromise replicas cor-
rectness for different purposes, such as gaining access to protected data, interferingwith
the service provisioning (e.g. by delaying operations or by compromising the integrity
of the service), reducing service availability with the final aim to damage the service
provider (reducing its reputation or letting it pay for the violation of service level agree-
ments), etc. A compromised replica is usually modeled trough an arbitrary failure (i.e.
a Byzantine failure) that is made transparent to clients by employing Byzantine Fault
Tolerance (BFT) techniques. Common approaches to BFT are based on the deployment
of a sufficiently large number of replicas to tolerate an estimated number f of compro-
mised servers (i.e. BFT replication). However, this approach has a strong limitation: a
smart adversary may be able to compromise more than f replicas in long executions
and may get access to the entire system when the attack is sufficiently long. To over-
come this issue, Sousa et al. designed the proactive-reactive recovery mechanism [21].
The basic idea is to periodically reconfigure the set of replicas to rejuvenate servers that
may be under attack (proactive mode) and/or when a failure is detected (reactive mode).
This approach is effective in long executions but requires a fine tuning of the replica-
tion parameters (upper bound f on the number of possible compromised replicas in a
given period, rejuvenation window, time required by the state transfer, etc...) and the
presence of secure components in the system. In addition, it is extremely costly during
good periods (i.e. periods of normal execution) as a high number of replicas must be
deployed independently from their real need. In other words, the system pays the cost
of an attack even if the attack never takes place.
In this paper,we want to investigate the possibility to implement a distributed shared
variable (i.e. a register) without making any assumption on the knowledge of the num-
ber of possible compromised replicas, i.e. without relating the total number of replicas
n to the number of possible compromised ones f . To overcome the impossibility re-
sult of [5,18], we assume that (i) clients preserve their privacy and do not disclose their
identifiers while interacting with server replicas (i.e. anonymous clients) and (ii) at least
one server is always alive and never compromised by the attacker. We first model our
protocol as a game between two parties, a client and a rational malicious server (i.e.
a server controlled by rational adversaries) where each rational malicious server gets
benefit by two conflicting goals: (i) it wants to have continuous access to the current
value of the register and, (ii) it wants to compromise the validity of the register return-
ing a fake value to a client. However, if the rational malicious server tries to accomplish
goal (ii) it could be detected by a client and it could be excluded from the computa-
tion, precluding it to achieve its first goal. We prove that, under some constraints, an
equilibrium exists for such game. In addition, we design some distributed protocols im-
plementing the register and reaching such equilibrium when rational malicious servers
privilege goal (i) with respect to goal (ii). As a consequence, rational malicious servers
return correct values to clients to avoid to be detected by clients and excluded by the
computation and the register implementation is proved to be correct.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related works,
Section 3 and Section 4 introduce respectively the system model and the problem state-
ment. In Section 5 we model the problem as a Bayesian game and in Section 6 we pro-
vide a protocol matching the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium that works under some limited
constraints, while in Section 7 we presents two variants of the protocol that relax the
constraints , at the expense of some additional communications between the clients or
protocol complexity increase. Finally, Section 8 presents a discussion and future work.
2 Related Work
Building a distributed storage able to resist arbitrary failures (i.e. Byzantine) is a widely
investigated research topic. The Byzantine failure model captures the most general type
of failure as no assumption is made on the behavior of faulty processes. Traditional so-
lutions to build a Byzantine tolerant storage service can be divided into two categories:
replicated state machines [19] and Byzantine quorum systems [5,16,17,18]. Both the
approaches are based on the idea that the state of the storage is replicated among pro-
cesses and the main difference is in the number of replicas involved simultaneously in
the state maintenance protocol. Replicated state machines approach requires that every
non-faulty replica receives every request and processes requests in the same order be-
fore returning to the client [19] (i.e. it assumes that processes are able to totally order
requests and execute them according to such order). Given the upper bound on the num-
ber of failures f , the replicated state machine approach requires only 2f +1 replicas in
order to provide a correct register implementation. Otherwise, Byzantine quorum sys-
tems need just a sub-set of the replicas (i.e. quorum) to be involved simultaneously. The
basic idea is that each operation is executed by a quorum and any two quorums must
intersect (i.e. members of the quorum intersection act as witnesses for the correct execu-
tion of both the operations). Given the number of failures f , the quorum-based approach
requires at least 3f+1 replicas in order to provide a correct register implementation in a
fully asynchronous system [18]. Let us note that, in both the approaches, the knowledge
of the upper bound on faulty servers f is required to provide deterministic correctness
guarantees. In this paper, we follow an orthogonal approach. We are going to consider
a particular case of byzantine failures and we study the cost, in terms of number of hon-
est servers, of building a distributed storage (i.e. a register) when clients are anonymous
and have no information about the number of faulty servers (i.e. they do not know the
bound f ). In particular, the byzantine processes here considered deviate from the pro-
tocol by following a strategy that brings them to optimize their own benefits (i.e., they
are rational) and such strategy has the final aim to compromise the correctness of the
storage (i.e., they are malicious). In [15], the authors presented Depot, a cloud storage
system able to tolerate any number of Byzantine clients or servers, at the cost of a weak
consistency semantics called Fork-Join-Causal consistency (i.e., a weak form of causal
consistency).
Another different solution can rely on proactive secret sharing [25]. Secret Sharing
[26] guarantees that a secret shared by a client among n parties (servers) cannot be ob-
tained by an adversary corrupting no more than f servers (f imposed by the protocol).
Moreover, if no more than f servers are Byzantines, the client can correctly recover the
secret from the shares provided by any f + 1 servers. Recent Proactive Secret Shar-
ing protocols, e.g. [27], show that Secret sharing can be applied also to synchronous
networks. Even if Proactive Secret Sharing can guarantee the privacy of the data (this
is out of the scope of the paper) against up to n − 2 passive adversaries, the solution
has some limitations. First fo all, clients are not able to verify whether the number of
Byzantines exceeds t and hence understand if the message obtained is correct. Secondly,
Secret Sharing protocols operating in a synchronous distributed system with Byzantines
(active adversaries) correctly work with a small number of Byzantines and have high
complexity (f < n/2− 1 andO(n4) in [27]).
In [3], the authors introduced the BAR (Byzantine, Altruistic, Rational) model to rep-
resent distributed systems with heterogeneous entities like peer-to-peer networks. This
model allows to distinguish between Byzantine processes (arbitrarily deviating from
the protocol, without any known strategy), altruistic processes (honestly following the
protocol) and rational processes (may decide to follow or not the protocol, according
to their individual utility). Under the BAR model, several problems have been investi-
gated (e.g. reliable broadcast [7], data stream gossip [13], backup service through state
machine replication [3]). Let us note that in the BAR model the utility of a process is
measured through the cost sustained to run the protocol. In particular, each step of the
algorithm (especially sending messages) has a cost and the objective of any rational
process is to minimize its global cost. As a consequence, rational selfish processes de-
viate from the protocol just by skipping to send messages, if not properly encouraged
by some reward. In contrast with the BAR model, in this paper we consider malicious
rational servers that can deviate from the protocol with different objectives, benefiting
from preventing the correct protocol execution rather than from saving messages.
More recently, classical one-shot problems as leader election [1,2], renaming and
consensus [2] have been studied under the assumption of rational agents (or rational
processes). The authors provide algorithms implementing such basic building blocks,
both for synchronous and asynchronous networks, under the so called solution prefer-
ence assumption i.e., agents gain if the algorithm succeeds in its execution while they
have zero profit if the algorithm fails. As a consequence, processes will not deviate from
the algorithm if such deviation interferes with its correctness. Conversely, the model of
rational malicious processes considered in this paper removes implicitly this assump-
tion as they are governed by adversaries that get benefit when the algorithm fails while
in [1,2] rational processes get benefit from the correct termination of the protocol (i.e.
they are selfish according with the BAR model).
Finally, the model considered here can be seen as a particular case of BAR where
rational servers take malicious actions, with the application similar to the one consid-
ered in [3]. However, in contrast to [3], we do not assume any trusted third party to
identify users, we assume that clients are anonymous (e.g., they are connected through
the Tor anonymous network [22]), and we investigate the impact of this assumption to-
gether with the rational model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that
analyzes how the anonymity can help in managing rational malicious behaviors.
3 System Model
The distributed system is composed by a set of n servers implementing a distributed
shared memory abstraction and by an arbitrary large but finite set of clients C. Servers
are fully identified (i.e. they have associated a unique identifier s1, s2 . . . sn) while
clients are anonymous, i.e. they share the same identifier.
Communicationmodel and timing assumptions. Processes can communicate only by
exchanging messages through reliable communication primitives, i.e. messages are not
created, duplicated or dropped. The system is synchronous in the following sense: all
the communication primitives used to exchange messages guarantee a timely delivery
property. In particular, we assume that clients communicate with servers trough a timely
reliable broadcast primitive (i.e., there exists an integer δ, known by clients, such that if
a client broadcasts a messagem at time t and a server si deliversm, then all the servers
sj deliver m by time t + δ). Servers-client and client-client communications are done
through “point-to-point” anonymous timely channels (a particular case of the commu-
nication model presented in [9] for the most general case of homonyms). Considering
that clients are identified by the same identifier ℓ, when a process sends a point-to-point
message m to an identifier ℓ, all the clients will deliverm. More formally, there exists
an integer δ′ ≤ δ, known by processes, such that if si sends a message m to a client
identified by an identifier ℓ at time t, then all the clients identified by ℓ receive m by
time t+ δ′. We assume that channels are authenticated (“oral” model), i.e. when a pro-
cess identified by j receives a messagem from a process identified by i, then pj knows
thatm has been generated by a process having identifier i.
Failure model. Servers are partitioned into two disjoint sub-sets: honest servers and
malicious servers (attackers). Honest servers behave according to the protocol executed
in the distributed system (discussed in Section 6) while malicious servers represent
entities compromised by an adversary that may deviate from the protocol by dropping
messages (omission failures), changing the content of a message, creating spuriousmes-
sages, exchanging information outside the protocol, etc. Malicious servers are rational,
i.e. they deviate from the protocol by following a strategy that aims at increasing their
own benefit (usually performing actions that may prevent the correct execution of the
protocol). We assume that rational malicious servers act independently, i.e. they do not
form a coalition and each of them acts for its individual gain. Servers may also fail by
crashing and we identify as alive the set of non crashed servers3. However, we assume
that at least one honest alive server always exists in the distributed system.
4 Regular Registers
A register is a shared variable accessed by a set of processes, i.e. clients, through two
operations, namely read() and write(). Informally, the write() operation updates the
value stored in the shared variable while the read() obtains the value contained in the
variable (i.e. the last written value). Every operation issued on a register is, generally,
not instantaneous and it can be characterized by two events occurring at its boundary: an
invocation event and a reply event. These events occur at two time instants (invocation
time and reply time) according to the fictional global time.
An operation op is complete if both the invocation event and the reply event occur
(i.e. the process executing the operation does not crash between the invocation and the
reply). Contrary, an operation op is said to be failed if it is invoked by a process that
crashes before the reply event occurs. According to these time instants, it is possible to
state when two operations are concurrent with respect to the real time execution. For
ease of presentation we assume the existence of a fictional global clock and the invoca-
tion time and response time of operations are defined with respect to this fictional clock.
Given two operations op and op′, and their invocation event and reply event times
(tB(op) and tB(op
′)) and return times (tE(op) and tE(op
′)), we say that op precedes
op′ (op ≺ op′) iff tE(op) < tB(op′). If op does not precede op′ and op′ does not pre-
cede op, then op and op′ are concurrent (op||op′). Given a write(v) operation, the value
v is said to be written when the operation is complete.
In case of concurrency while accessing the shared variable, the meaning of last
written value becomes ambiguous. Depending on the semantics of the operations, three
types of register have been defined by Lamport [14]: safe, regular and atomic. In this
paper, we consider a regular register which is specified as follows:
– Termination: If an alive client invokes an operation, it eventually returns from that
operation.
– Validity: A read operation returns the last value written before its invocation, or a
value written by a write operation concurrent with it.
3 Alive servers may be both honest or malicious.
Interestingly, safe, regular and atomic registers have the same computational power.
This means that it is possible to implement a multi-writer/multi-reader atomic register
from single-writer/single-reader safe registers. There are several papers in the literature
discussing such transformations (e.g., [6,11,20,23,24] to cite a few). In this paper, we
assume that the register is single writer in the sense that no two write() operations may
be executed concurrently. However, any client in the system may issue a write() oper-
ation. This is not a limiting assumption as clients may use an access token to serialize
their writes4. We will discuss in Section 8 how this assumption can be relaxed.
5 Modeling the Register protocol as a Game
In a distributed system where clients are completely disjoint from servers, it is possible
to abstract any register protocol as a sequence of requests made by clients (e.g. a request
to get the value or a request to update the value) and responses (or replies) provided
by servers, plus some local computation. If all servers are honest, clients will always
receive the expected replies and all replies will always provide the right information
needed by the client to correctly terminate the protocol. Otherwise, a compromised
server can, according to its strategy, omit to send a reply or can provide bad information
to prevent the client from terminating correctly. In this case, in order to guarantee a
correct execution, the client tries to detect such misbehavior, react and punish the server.
Thus, a distributed protocol implementing a register in presence of rational malicious
servers can be modeled as a two-party game between a client and each of the servers
maintaining a copy of the register: the client wants to correctly access the register while
the server wants to prevent the correct execution of a read() without being punished.
Players. The two players are respectively the client and the server. Each player can play
with a different role: servers can be divided into honest servers and malicious servers
while clients can be divided in those asking a risky request (i.e., clients able to detect
misbehaviors and punish server5) and those asking for a risk-less request (i.e., clients
unable to punish servers).
Strategies. Players’ strategies are represented by all the possible actions that a process
may take. Clients have just one strategy, identified by R, that is request information to
servers. Contrarily, servers have different strategies depending on their failure state:
– malicious servers have three possible strategies: (i)A, i.e. attack the client by send-
ing back wrong information (it can reply with a wrong value, with a wrong times-
tamp or both), (ii)NA, i.e. not attack the client behaving according to the protocol
and (iii) S, i.e. be silent omitting the answer to client’s requests;
– honest servers have just theNA strategy.
Let us note that the game between a honest client and a honest server is trivial as
they have just one strategy that is to follow the protocol. Thus, in the following we
are going to skip this case and we will consider only the game between a client and a
rational malicious server.
4 Let us recall that we are in a synchronous system and the mutual exclusion problem can be
easily solved also in presence of failures.
5 Notice that the client ability to detect a server misbehaviors depends on the specific protocol.
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Fig. 1. Extensive form of the game. Dashed line represents the unknown nature of requests from
the risk point of view. Outcome pairs refer to client and server gains respectively.
Utility functions and extensive form of the game. Clients and servers have opposite
utility functions. In particular:
– every client increases its utility when it is able to read a correct value from the
register and it wants to maximize the number of successful read() operations;
– every server increases its utility when it succeeds to prevent the client from reading
a correct value, while it loses when it is detected by the client and it is punished.
In the following, we will denote as Gc the gain obtained by the client when it suc-
ceeds in reading, Gs the gain obtained by the server when it succeeds in preventing
the client from reading and as Dc the gain of the client when detecting the server and
as Ds the loss of the server when it is detected. Such parameters are characteristic of
every server and describe its behavior in terms of subjective gains/losses they are able
to tolerate. Without loss of generality, we assume thatGc,Gs,Dc andDs are all greater
than 0, that all the servers have the same Gs and Ds
6 and that all the clients have the
same Gc andDc. Fig. 1 shows the extensive form of the game.
The game we are considering is a Bayesian game [10] as servers do not have knowl-
edge about the client role but they can estimate the probability of receiving a risky re-
quest or a risk-less request i.e., they have a belief about the client role. We denote as θ
(with θ ∈ [0, 1]) the server belief of receiving a risky request (i.e. the client may detect
that the server is misbehaving) and with 1 − θ the server belief of receiving a risk-less
request (i.e. the client is not be able to detect that the server is misbehaving).
Analysis of the Bayesian Game. In the following, we are going to analyze the exis-
tence (if any) of a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium i.e., a Nash Equilibrium7 computed by
considering the players’ belief.
Let us note that in our game, clients have just one strategy. Thus, the existence of the
equilibrium depends only on the decisions taken by servers according to their utility
parameters Gs, Ds and their belief about the nature of a request (i.e., its evaluation of
θ). Let us now compute the expected gain E() of a server si while selecting strategies
6 Let us note that if two servers have different values for Gs and Ds, the analysis shown in the
following is simply repeated for each server.
7 Let us recall that a Nash Equilibrium exists when each player selects a strategy and none of
the players increases its utility by changing strategy.
S, NA and A:
E(S) = (−Ds × (1 − θ)) + (−Ds × θ) = −Ds (1)
E(NA) = ((1− θ)× 0) + (θ × 0) = 0 (2)
E(A) = ((1− θ)×Gs)− (θ ×Ds) (3)
Lemma 1. The strategy S is a dominated strategy.
Proof A server si would choose to follows S over NA or A if (i) E(S) > E(A) or
E(S) > E(NA). However, considering that both Ds and Gs are grater that 0, from
equations (1)− (3) we will have that si will never choose to play S. ✷Lemma 1
It follows that servers have no gain in playing S, whatever the other player does (cf.
Lemma 1). In fact, there would be no increment of their utility by playing S and then
we will not consider such strategy anymore.
Let us note that a server si would prefer to play NA (i.e., to behave honestly) with
respect to A (i.e., to deviate from the protocol) when E(NA) > E(A). Combining
equations (3) and (2) we have that a si would prefer to play NA when
Gs
(Gs +Ds)
> θ. (4)
The parameters Gs and Ds are strictly dependent on the attackers profile (i.e., an at-
tacker for which is more important to stay in the system rather than subvert it or vice
versa), thus we can not directly work on them. In the remaining part of the work we
propose protocols to tune the θ parameter in such a way that the inequality (4) holds.
To this purpose, we derive the following Lemmas:
Lemma 2. Let si be a rational malicious server. If Ds < Gs and θ <
1
2 then the best
response of si is to play strategyA (i.e.NA is a dominated strategy).
Proof Equation (4) can be rewritten as
1
1 + α
> θ
where α = DsGs . Considering that Gs > Ds it follows that α ∈ (0, 1). Note that
si would prefer to play A each time that inequality (4) is satisfied and that θ is upper
bounded by 12 , it follows that si will prefer to play A for any θ ∈ [0,
1
2 ) and the claim
follows. ✷Lemma 2
Lemma 3. Let si be a rational malicious server. If Ds > Gs and θ ≥
1
2 then the best
response of si is to never play strategyA (i.e.NA is a dominant strategy).
Proof Equation (4) can be rewritten as
1
1 + α
> θ
Note that Gs < Ds and then α ∈ (1,∞). Considering that si would prefer to play
A each time that inequality (4) is satisfied and that θ is lower bounded by 12 , it follows
that si will never prefer to playA for any θ ∈ [
1
2 , 1] and the claim follows.
✷Lemma 3
6 A Protocol P for a Regular Register whenDs ≫ Gs
In this section, we propose a protocol P implementing a regular register in a syn-
chronous distributed system with anonymous clients and up to n− 1 malicious rational
servers. The protocol works under the assumption that the server loss Ds in case of
detection is much higher than its gain Gs obtained when the client fails during a read
(i.e. Ds ≫ Gs8). This assumption models a situation where the attacker is much more
interested in having access to data stored in the register and occasionally interfere with
the server rather than causing a reduction of the availability (e.g., no termination or va-
lidity violation). We will relax this assumption to the simple case Ds > Gs in the next
section extending P in two different ways.
Our protocol P follows the classical quorum-based approach. When a client wants
to write, it sends the new value together with its timestamp to servers and waits for
acknowledgments. Similarly, when it wants to read, it asks for values and corresponding
timestamps and then it tries to select a value among the received ones. Let us note that,
due to the absence of knowledge on the upper bound of malicious processes, it could
be impossible for a reader to select a value among those reported by servers and, in
addition, the reader may be unable to distinguish well behaving servers from malicious
ones. To overcome this issue we leverage on the following observation: the last client
cw writing a value v is able to recognize such value while reading after its write (as long
as no other updates have been performed). This makes the writer cw the only one able to
understand which server si is reporting a wrong value vi 6= v, detect it as malicious and
punish it by excluding si from the computation. Thus, the basic idea behind the protocol
is to exploit the synchrony of the system and the anonymity of clients to makes the
writer indistinguishable from readers and “force” malicious servers to behave correctly.
Let us note that anonymity itself is not enough to make the writer indistinguishable
from other clients. In fact, if we consider a naive solution where we add anonymity to
a register implementation (e.g., to the one given by Attiya, Bar-Noy and Dolev [4]), we
have that servers may exploit the synchrony of the channels to estimate when the end of
the write operation occurs and to infer whether a read request may arrive from the writer
or from a different client (e.g., when it is received too close to a write request and before
the expected end of the write). To this aim, we added in the write() operation imple-
mentation some dummy read requests. These messages are actually needed to generate
message patterns that make impossible to servers to distinguish messages coming from
the writer from messages arriving from a different client. As a consequence, received a
read request, a server si is not able to distinguish if such request is risky (i.e. it comes
from the writer) or is risk-less (i.e. it comes from a generic client).
8 More precisely, P works when Ds > cGs where c is the estimated number of clients in the
system.
In addition, we added a detection procedure that is executed both during read() and
write() operations by any client. In particular, such procedure checks that every server
answered to a request and that the reported information are “coherent” with its knowl-
edge (e.g., timestamps are not too old or too new). The detection is done first locally, by
exploiting the information that clients collect during the protocol execution, and then,
when a client detects a server sj , it disseminates its detection so that the malicious
server is permanently removed from the computation (collaborative detection).
Finally, the timestamp used to label a new written value is updated by leveraging
acknowledgments sent by servers at the end of the preceding write() operation. In par-
ticular, during each write() operation, servers must acknowledge the write of the value
by sending back the corresponding timestamp. This is done on the anonymous chan-
nels that deliver such message to all the clients that will update their local timestamp
accordingly. As a consequence, any rational server is inhibited from deviating from the
protocol, unless it accepts the high risk to be detected as faulty and removed from the
system.
In the following, we provide a detailed description of the protocol P shown in Fig-
ures 2-4.
The read() operation (Fig. 2).When a client wants to read, it first checks if the last ts
variable is still equal to 0. If so, then there is no write() operation terminated before
the invocation of the read() and the client returns the default value ⊥ (line 04, Fig.
2(a)). Otherwise, ci queries the servers to get the last value of the register by sending a
READ()message (line 06, Fig. 2(a)) and remains waiting for 2δ times, i.e. the maximum
round trip message delay (line 07, Fig. 2(a)).
When a server si delivers a READ() message, the readingi counter is increased by one
and then si sends a REPLY(< i, tsi, vali, old tsi, old vali >) message containing the
current and old values and timestamp stored locally (lines 03 - 04, Fig. 2(b)).
When the reading client delivers a REPLY(< j, ts, val, ots, ov >) message, it stores
locally the reply in two tuples containing respectively the current and the old triples
with server id, timestamp and corresponding value (lines 24 - 25, Fig. 2(a)). When
the reader client is unblocked from the wait statement, it checks if there exists a pair
< ts, val > in the replies set that has been reported by all servers it believes honest
(line 08, Fig. 2(a)) and, in this case, it sends a READ ACK() message (line 09, Fig. 2(a))
and it returns the corresponding value (line 10, Fig. 2(a)). Received the READ ACK()
message, a server si just decreases by one its readingi counter (line 05, Fig. 2(b)).
Otherwise, a write() operation may be in progress. To check if it is the case, the client
keeps waiting for other δ time units and then checks again if a good value exists (lines 11
- 12, Fig. 2(a)). If, after this period, the value is not yet found, it means that some of the
servers behaved maliciously. Therefore, the client executes the detection() procedure
to understand who is misbehaving (cfr. Fig. 4). Let us note that such procedure cleans
up the set of honest servers when they are detected to be malicious. Therefore, after the
execution of the procedure, the reader checks for the last time if a good value exists in
its replies set and, if so, it returns such value (line 18, Fig. 2(a)); otherwise the special
value abort is returned (line 19, Fig. 2(a)). In any case, a READ ACK() is sent to block
the forwarding of new values at the server side (line 16, Fig. 2(a)).
Init:
(01) replies← ∅;my last val ← ⊥;my last ts← 0; last ts← 0;
(02) ack← ∅; honest← {s1, s2 . . . sn}; writing ← false;
———————————————————————————————–
operation read():
(03) if (last ts = 0)
(04) then return⊥;
(05) else replies ← ∅;
(06) broadcast READ();
(07) wait (2δ);
(08) if (∀ si ∈ honest, ∃ < −, ts, val > ∈ replies)
(09) then broadcast READACK();
(10) return val;
(11) else wait (δ);
(12) if (∀ si ∈ honest, ∃ < −, ts, val > ∈ replies)
(13) then broadcast READACK();
(14) return val;
(15) else execute detection(repliesi, R)
(16) broadcast READACK();
(17) if (∀ si ∈ honest, ∃ < −, ts, val > ∈ replies)
(18) then return val;
(19) else abort ;
(20) endif
(21) endif
(22) endif
(23) endif
————————————————————————————————
when REPLY(< j, ts, v, ots, ov >) is delivered:
(24) replies ← replies ∪ {< j, ts, v >};
(25) replies ← replies ∪ {< j, ots, ov >};
————————————————————————————————
when DETECTED(sj ) is delivered:
(26) honest← honest \ {sj};
(a) Client Protocol
Init:
(01) vali ← ∅; tsi ← 0;
(02) old vali ← ⊥; old tsi ← 0; readingi ← 0;
————————————————————————————————
when READ() is delivered:
(03) readingi ← readingi + 1;
(04) send REPLY (< i, tsi, vali, old tsi, old vali >);
————————————————————————————————
when READACK() is delivered:
(05) readingi ← readingi − 1;
(b) Server Protocol
Fig. 2. The read() protocol for a synchronous system.
The write() operation (Fig. 3). When a client wants to write, it first sets its writing
flag to true, stores locally the value and the corresponding timestamp, obtained incre-
menting by one the current timestamp stored in last ts variable (lines 01 - 02, Fig.
3(a)), sends a WRITE() message to servers, containing the value to be written and the
corresponding timestamp (line 03, Fig. 3(a)), and remains waiting for δ time units.
When a server si delivers a WRITE(v, ts) message, it checks if the received timestamp
is greater than the one stored in the tsi variable. If so, si updates its local variables
keeping the current value and timestamp as old and storing the received ones as cur-
rent (lines 02 - 05, Fig. 3(b)). Contrarily, si checks if the timestamp is the same stored
locally in tsi. If this happens, it just adds the new value to the set vali (line 06, Fig.
operation write(v):
(01) writing ← true; ack← ∅;
(02) my last ts← last ts + 1;my last val← v;
(03) broadcast WRITE(< my last val,my last ts >);
(04) wait(δ);
(05) replies ← ∅;
(06) broadcast READ();
(07) wait(δ);
(08) broadcast READ();
(09) execute detection(ack,A);
(10) wait(δ);
(11) execute detection(repliesi, R);
(12) broadcast READACK();
(13) broadcast READACK();
(14) writing ← false;
(15) return(ok).
————————————————————————————————————————-
when WRITE ACK(ts, sj) is delivered:
(16) if (ts ≥ my last ts) then ack← ack ∪ {< j, ts,− >} endif
————————————————————————————————————————-
when ∃ ts such that S = {j|∃ < j, ts′,− >∈ ack} ∧ S ⊇ honest:
(17) if (ts ≥ last ts) then last ts← ts endif
(18) for each< j, ts′,− > ∈ ack such that ts′ = ts do ack← ack\ < j, ts′,− > endFor.
(a) Client Protocol
when WRITE(< val, ts >) is delivered:
(01) if (ts > tsi)
(02) then old tsi ← tsi ;
(03) old vali ← vali ;
(04) tsi ← ts;
(05) vali ← {val};
(06) else if (tsi = ts) then vali ← vali ∪ {val}; endif
(07) endIf
(08) send WRITE ACK(ts, i);
(09) if (readingi > 0) then send REPLY (< i, tsi, vali, old tsi, old vali >) endif.
(b) Server Protocol
Fig. 3. write() protocol for a synchronous system.
3(b)). In any case, si sends back an ACK() message with the received timestamp (lines
08, Fig. 3(b)) and forwards the new value if some read() operation is in progress (lines
09, Fig. 3(b)). Delivering an ACK() message, the writer client checks if the timestamp
is greater equal than itsmy last ts and, if so, it adds a tuple< j, ts,− > to its ack set
(line 16, Fig. 3(a)).
When the writer is unblocked from the wait statement, it sends a READ() message,
waits for δ time units and sends another READ() message (lines 06 - 08, Fig. 3(a)). This
message has two main objectives: (i) create a message pattern that makes impossible
to malicious servers to distinguish a real reader from the writer and (ii) collect values
to detect misbehaving servers. In this way, a rational malicious server, that aims at re-
maining in the system, is inhibited from misbehaving as it could be detected from the
writer and removed from the computation. The writer, in fact, executes the detection()
procedure both on the ack set and on the replies set collected during the write() (lines
09 - 11, Fig. 3(a)). Finally, the writer sends two READ ACK() messages to block the
forwarding of replies, resets its writing flag to false and returns from the operation
(lines 12 - 15, Fig. 3(a)).
procedure detection(replies set, set type):
(01) S = {j|∃ < j,−,− >∈ replies set};
(02) if (honest 6⊆ S)
(03) then for each sj ∈ (honesti \ S) do
(04) trigger detect(sj);
(05) honesti ← honesti \ {sj};
(06) broadcast DETECTED(sj );
(07) endFor
(08) endif
(09) if (set type = R)
(10) then if (writing)
(11) thenR = {j|∃ < j,my last val,my last ts >∈ replies set};
(12) if (honest 6⊆ R)
(13) then for each sj ∈ (honesti \ R) do
(14) trigger detect(sj);
(15) honesti ← honesti \ {sj};
(16) broadcast DETECTED(sj );
(17) endFor
(18) endIf
(19) else for each< j, ts,− >∈ replies set such that ts < last ts− 1 do
(20) trigger detect(sj);
(21) honest← honest \ {sj};
(22) broadcast DETECTED(sj );
(23) endFor
(24) for each< j, ts, val >∈ replies set such that ts = my last ts do
(25) Di = {v | (∃ < j, ts, val >∈ replies set) ∧ (ts = my last ts)};
(26) if ((my last val 6= ⊥) ∧ (my last ts = last ts) ∧ (last val /∈ Di))
(27) then trigger detect(sj);
(28) honest← honest \ {sj};
(29) broadcast DETECTED(sj );
(30) endif
(31) endFor
(32) for each< j, ts, val >∈ replies set such that ts > last ts+ 1 do
(33) trigger detect(sj);
(34) honesti ← honesti \ {sj};
(35) broadcast DETECTED(sj );
(36) endFor
(37) endif
(38) else for each< j, ts,− >∈ replies set such that ts 6= my last ts do
(39) trigger detect(sj);
(40) honest ← honest \ {sj};
(41) broadcast DETECTED(sj );
(42) endFor
(43) endif.
Fig. 4. detection() function invoked by an anonymous client for a synchronous system.
Let us note that, the execution of a write() operation triggers the update of the last ts
variable at any client. This happens when in the ack set there exists a timestamp re-
ported by any honest server (lines 17 - 18, Fig. 3(a)).
The detection() procedure (Fig 4). This procedure is used by clients to detect servers
misbehaviors during the execution of read() and write() operations. It takes as parame-
ter a set (that can be the replies set or the ack set) and a flag that identifies the type of
the set (i.e. A for ack, R for replies). In both cases, the client checks if it has received
at least one message from any server it saw honest and detects as faulty all the servers
omitting a message (lines 01 - 08).
If the set to be checked is a set of ACK() messages, the client (writer) just checks if
some server sj acknowledged a timestamp that is different from the one it is using in
the current write() and, if so, sj is detected as malicious (lines 38 - 42). Otherwise, if
the set is the replies set (flagged as R), the client checks if it is running the procedure
while it is writing or reading (line 10). If the client is writing, it just updated the state
of the register. Thus, the writer checks that all servers sent back the pair < v, ts >
corresponding to the one stored locally in the variables my last val and my last ts.
If someone reported a bad value or timestamp, it is detected as misbehaving (lines 11 -
18). If the client is reading, it is able to detect servers sending back timestamps that are
too old (lines 19 - 23) or too new to be correct (lines 32 - 36) or servers sending back
the right timestamp but with a wrong value (lines 24 - 31).
6.1 Correctness Proofs forP
In the following we prove that the protocol presented in Fig. 2 - 4 terminates (Lemma
4, Lemma 5 and Theorem 1), and demonstrate some properties of the timestamp mech-
anism used to label write() operations. In particular, we prove that the protocol ensures
the increasing monotonic order of timestamps (Lemma 8) and the consistency of the
variable storing the last used timestamp (Lemma 7). In Lemma 9 we prove that the
last written value persists locally at each honest server, while Theorem 2 proves that if
servers behave honestly then the protocol emulates a regular register. Then we prove
the accuracy of the detection function (Lemma 11, Lemma 12 and Theorem 3) and that
the proposed protocolP emulates a regular register under specific conditions (Theorem
4).
Lemma 4. Let cℓ be an anonymous client invoking a write() operation. If cℓ executes
the protocol in Fig. 3 then it eventually returns from the write() operation.
Proof The proof simply follows by observing that in the write() operation code (e.g.
Fig. 3(a)) the return event happens after three wait() statement. Thus, considering that
cℓ is honest, it will be unblocked, from the last wait() statement, 3δ time units after the
write() invocation and the claim follows. ✷Lemma 4
Lemma 5. Let cℓ be an anonymous client invoking a read() operation. If cℓ executes
the protocol in Fig. 2 then it eventually returns from the read() operation.
Proof The proof simply follows by observing that in the read() operation code a return
event is defined in every branch of the code and it only depends on wait() statements.
Thus, considering that cℓ is honest, it will be unblocked in a finite time after the read()
invocation and the claim follows. ✷Lemma 5
Theorem 1 (Termination). Let cℓ be an anonymous client invoking an operation op.
If cℓ executes the protocol in Fig. 2 - 4 then it eventually returns from op.
Proof The proof directly follows from Lemma 4 and Lemma 5. ✷Theorem 1
Lemma 6. Let op be a write() operation and let ts be the timestamp associated by
the writer to op. If a malicious server si deviates from the protocol by omitting the
WRITE ACK(ts) message or by sending a WRITE ACK(ts′) message (with ts′ 6= ts),
then si will be detected as malicious by any client.
Proof The detection() function is executed by the writer client on the ack set at line
09, Fig. 3(a). The ack set is emptied at the beginning of every write() operation and
it is filled-in by the writer when it deliver WRITE ACK(ts′) messages. Such messages
are sent by servers when delivering a WRITE(< ts, val >) message sent by the writer
at the beginning of the operation. The proof simply follows by considering that the
writer client knows the real value of the timestamp associated to the write and stored
in itsmy last ts local variable (line 02, Fig. 3(a)). Thus, when the writer executes the
detection() function the writer checks (i) if it has received a WRITE ACK() message
from any servers it sees (line 01-07, Fig. 4) and (ii) if all the alive servers acknowledge
the right timestamp (line 38-42, Fig. 4). Considering that the communications are timely
and the detection happens 2δ time units after the broadcast of the WRITE(< ts, val >)
message (i.e. after the maximum round trip delay), if some servers do not answer they
are detected as malicious as they omitted to answer. In the second case, since the writer
know its timestamp and channel are authenticated, it is able to detect as malicious the
server answering with a different timestamp. Finally, considering that (i) the writer
notifies to all the other clients its detections, (ii) such detections are done δ time units
before the end of the write and (iii) clients notifications delay is also bounded by δ, it
follows that at the end of the write any client detected the malicious servers and the
claim follows. ✷Lemma 6
Lemma 7. At the end of every write() operation any client stores in its last ts variable
the same timestamp.
Proof Every client initializes its last ts variable to 0 during the init phase (line 01, Fig.
2(a)). Such variable is updated at line 17, Fig. 3(a) when the client stores in its ack set
a timestamp ts′ that has been acknowledged by any alive server and that is greater than
the previous one (to preserve the monotonically increasing order of timestamps). Then,
we just need to prove that if a client updates its last ts variable then all the clients will
update it as well.
Considering that (i)WRITE ACK(ts′)messages are sent by serverswhen aWRITE(<
val, ts′ >) message is delivered, (ii) WRITE(< val, ts′ >) messages are sent to all the
servers and (iii) WRITE ACK(ts′) messages are sent through point-to-point anonymous
channels, we have that all clients receive WRITE ACK(ts′) messages from the same set
of servers. In addition, due to Lemma 6, we have that the set of alive processes is shared
by every client and the claim follows.
✷Lemma 7
Lemma 8. Let op and op′ be two write() operations such that op ≺ op′. Let ts and ts′
be respectively the timestamp associated to op and to op′, then ts < ts′.
Proof The proof simply follows by Lemma 7 and considering that the timestamp asso-
ciated to a write() operation is computed by incrementing the last ts variable by one.
✷Lemma 8
Corollary 1. If there not exists two concurrent write() operations, for any pair of
write() w1, w2 such that w1 ≺ w2 and there not exists anyw3 such thatw1 ≺ w3 ≺ w2
then the timestamp ts2 associated to w1 is equal to ts1 + 1.
Proof The proof simply follows by considering that timestamps are computed by in-
crementing the last ts variable and it is updated at most once during each write() op-
eration. ✷Corollary 1
Lemma 9. At the end of a write(v) operation, every server si behaving honestly stores
the value v in its vali local variable.
Proof Every server si updates its valuei variable in line 05 or line 06, Fig. 3(b). In
particular, this happens when the timestamp attached to the WRITE() message and as-
sociated to the write() operation is greater equal than the one stored in tsi. Due to
Lemma 8, timestamps follows a monotonically increasing order and thus every write()
operation will have a timestamp that is greater or equal than the one previously stored.
As a consequence, when delivering a WRITE(< val, ts′ >) message, any server si
will always execute line 05 or 06, Fig. 3(b) storing locally the new value and the claim
follows. ✷Lemma 9
To the ease of presentation, let us assume that the default value ⊥ is written by a
fictional instantaneous write(⊥) operation preceding every operation op executed by
clients and let us define a valid value as follows:
Definition 1. Let v be the value returned by a read() operation op invoked on the reg-
ular register. v is said to be valid if
(i) it is the value written by the last write() operation terminated before op or
(ii) it is the value written by a write() operation concurrent with op.
Lemma 10. If all the servers behave honestly (i.e. they follow the protocol presented
in Fig. 2(b) - 3(b)) then any read() operation returns a valid value.
Proof Let us suppose by contradiction that all servers follow the protocol and that there
exists a read() operation op that returns a value v that is not valid.
Let v old be the value written by the last write() terminated before the invocation of op.
If v is not valid, it means that v is different from v old and from the value v′ written
by a concurrent write(v′), if it exists.
Case 1 - No write() operation is concurrent with op. Due to Lemma 9, at time t when
op is invoked, any server will store locally in their valuei variable the value v old, to-
gether with its timestamp. Since the value stored in the register is updated only when
a WRITE() message is delivered (line 05 or 06, Fig. 3(b)), and this happens only when
a write() operation is triggered (line 03, Fig. 3(a)), we have that, if no write() opera-
tion is concurrent with op, v old, together with its timestamp, will be stored and not
updated by any server during the whole execution of op. Considering that any server
si behaves honestly, while delivering a READ() message, si will answer by sending a
REPLY(< i, tsi, valuei >) containing the same value and the same timestamp to the
reader (line 04, Fig. 2(b)). Thus, at time t + 2δ the replies set will contains n tuple
< v old, ts > and the condition at line 08, Fig. 2(a) holds terminating the read() oper-
ation with v old and we have a contradiction as it is a valid value.
Case 2 - There exists a write(v′) operation op′ concurrent with op. Without loss of
generality, let x be the timestamp associated to the value v old written by the last ter-
minated write() operation preceding op. Let us denote by op′ the write(v′) operation
concurrent with the read() operation op. Let us note that, according to the protocol in
Fig. 2(a), while executing the read() operation op, the reader client will inquiry servers
to get the value of the register together with its timestamp. Considering that, by assump-
tion, any alive server si behaves honestly, it follows that delivering a READ() message
si will answer by sending back a REPLY() message containing both the current and the
old value and timestamp. Such values are modified only al line 05 or 06, Fig. 3(b) when
a server si deliver a WRITE() message.
Let tB(op
′) and tB(op) the time at which respectively op
′ and op are invoked and
let tE(op
′) and tE(op) be respectively the return time of op
′ and op.
Let us consider the following cases:
– Case 2.1 - tB(op
′) + δ < tB(op) < tB(op
′) + 2δ.
At the beginning of the write() (i.e. at time tB(op
′)), the writer client sends a
WRITE() message (line 03, Fig. 3(a)) that will be delivered by any alive server
by time tB(op
′) + δ. When a server si receives a WRITE() message, it will update
its vali variable to v
′ and its tsi to the current timestamp
9. It follow that from time
tB(op
′)+δ any alive server will store locally the value v′ written by op′. Let us note
that, since op′ lasts until time tE(op
′) = tB(op
′) + 3δ and, by assumption, there
not exist concurrentwrite() operations, such variables will not be updated anymore
before time tB(op
′) + 3δ.
When an alive server si delivers a READ() message (between time tB(op
′) + δ
and tB(op
′) + 2δ), it executes line 04, Fig. 2(b) sending to the reader both the
current and the old values and timestamp through a REPLY() message. Delivering
such REPLY() message, the reader will store the values in its replies local variable
and waits until time tB(op) + 2δ before checking the content of such variable.
Considering that, by assumption, all the servers behave honestly, they will send the
content of their vali and tsi variable without changing them. As a consequence, the
reader will store locally in its replies set the same pair < v′, ts > from any alive
server. Thus, at time tB(op) + 2δ ≤ tB(op′) + 3δ, evaluating the condition at line
08, Fig. 2(a) the reader will select and return v′ and we have a contradiction.
– Case 2.2 - tB(op) < tB(op
′) + δ.
In this case, the WRITE() message is concurrent (wrt. the happened before relation)
9 Let us note that such variable will be always updated, as in line 05 or 06, Fig. 3(b), due to
Lemma 8.
with the READ() message. As a consequence, we may have that a server si deliver-
ing the READ() message before than the WRITE() message and a server sj deliver-
ing the WRITE() message before than the READ() message. As a consequence, si
will answer by sending a reply() message containing the old value v old and the
previous value (no more valid) while sj will answer by sending v old and v
′. How-
ever, when the client evaluates the replies set, it will find an occurrence of v old
for any alive server and evaluating the condition at line 12, Fig. 2(a) the reader will
select and return v old and we have a contradiction.
– Case 2.3 - tB(op
′) + 2δ < tB(op) < tE(op
′).
In this case, the READ() message may be delivered also after the end of op′. If no
more write() operations occur before the end of op, we fall down to case 2.1 and
the claim follows. Contrarily, we fall down the the situation of case 2.2 where the
concurrent write is a new write and the claim follow again.
✷Lemma 10
Theorem 2. Let cℓ be a client invoking a read() operation op. If all the servers behave
honestly, the protocol shown in Fig. 2 - 4 implements a regular register.
Proof The proof directly follows by Theorem 1 and Lemma 10. ✷Theorem 2
Lemma 11. Let cj be a client sending a READ() message at time t and let REPLY(<
i, ts, v, ots, ov >) be the message delivered by cj at time t
′ > t as reply to the READ().
Let lts be the value stored locally in the last ts variable by cj at time t
′. If |lts−ts| > 1
then si is malicious.
Proof Let us suppose by contradiction that si sends to cj a REPLY(< i, ts, v, ots, ov >)
such that |lts− ts| > 1 and si is honest.
The last ts local variable is updated to a certain value x by any client cj when (i)
cj delivered an ACK(< j, x,− >) message from any server it believes honest and (ii) x
is strictly greater than the previous value stored in last ts (line 17, Fig. 3(a)).
Let t′ be the time at which cj delivers the REPLY(< i, ts, v, ots, ov >)message and
let us denote with tup the time at which cj updated its last ts local variable to lts. If
tack is the time at which si delivered such WRITE(v, lts) message and it sent back the
ACK(< i, lts,− >) message to clients, it follows that tack < tup.
If at time t′ lts ≤ ts, it follows that tup ≤ t′, otherwise tup > t′. Let us consider
the two cases separately.
– Case 1 - tup ≤ t′. In this case t′ > tack. Let us note that the value ts sent by si in
the REPLY message is the value stored locally by si in the variable tsi. Let us call
trp the time at which si sends the REPLY(< i, ts, v, ots, ov >) message to cj and
let us consider the following cases:
• Case 1.1 - trp < tack. In this case, ts < lts and in particular, considering
that write() operations are sequential, due to Corollary 1, ts = lts − 1. Thus,
|lts− ts| = 1 and we have a contradiction.
• Case 1.2 - trp > tack. In this case, ts = lts and again we have a contradiction.
– Case 2 - tup > t
′. Let us note that the value ts sent by si in the REPLY message is
the value stored locally by si in the variable tsi. Let us call trp the time at which
si sends the REPLY(< i, ts, v, ots, ov >) message to cj and let us consider the
following cases:
• Case 2.1 - trp < tack. In this case, ts = lts and we have a contradiction.
• Case 2.2 - trp > tack. In this case, ts < lts and in particular, considering
that write() operations are sequential, due to Corollary 1, ts = lts − 1. Thus,
|lts− ts| = 1 and we have a contradiction.
✷Lemma 11
Lemma 12. Let cj be a client sending a READ() message at time t and let REPLY(<
i, ts, v, ots, ov >) be the message delivered to cj at time t
′ > t as reply to the READ().
Letmlts be the value stored locally in themy last ts variable and letmv be the value
stored locally in themy last value variable by cj at time t
′. Ifmlts = ts andmv 6= v
then si is malicious.
Proof The proof simply follows by considering that a client cj updates itsmy last ts
andmy last val local variables only at the beginning of a write() operation.
Due to Corollary 1, every write() operation has a unique timestamp thus if cj deliv-
ers a value v 6= mv it means that the server altered it and it cannot be honest.
✷Lemma 12
Lemma 13. Let cj be a client sending a WRITE(< j, ts, val >) message at time t. If
there exists a server sj such that sj does not send the triple < j, ts, val > by time
t+ 3δ, then sj is faulty.
Proof Considering that (i) the first READ() request is sent at time t + δ (line 06, Fig.
3(a)), (ii) the detection() procedure on replies set is performed at time t + 2δ (line
11, Fig. 3(a)) and (iii) there not exists concurrent write() operations, then any honest
server will always provide the expected triple and the claim follows. ✷Lemma 13
Lemma 14. Let cj a client sending aWRITE(j, ts, val)message at time t. If there exists
a server sj such that the triple< j, ts,− > does not appear in the ack set at time t+2δ,
then sj is detected as faulty.
Proof Considering that (i) the detection() procedure on ack set is performed at time
t+ 2δ (line 09, Fig. 3(a)) and (ii) there not exists concurrent write() operations, then a
honest server will provide the expected triple and the claim follows. ✷Lemma 14
Theorem 3. A honest alive server si is never detected as malicious.
Proof A server si deviates from the protocol if:
1. si omits to send ACK() messages during a write() or to sends REPLY() messages
during a read() (lines 02-07, Fig. 4).
2. si sends bad timestamps (i.e. too old, lines 19-23, Fig. 4 or too new, lines 32-36,
Fig. 4).
3. si sends a pair< value, ts >with the correct timestamp and the wrong value (lines
24-31, Fig. 4).
Thus, a honest server may be erroneously detected as faulty only if one of the pre-
vious cases occur. However, due to Lemmas 11 - 14, we have that if one of the previous
situation happens, si is necessarily malicious and the claim follows.
✷Theorem 3
Theorem 4. If Ds, Gs and θ are such that equation (4) holds then the protocol shown
in Fig. 2 - 4 implements a regular register with only 1 alive honest server.
Proof Let us first notice that the existence of the detection function creates the dualism
between risky requests and risk-less request. In addition, the existence of one honest
alive server prevents the attacker to create a collusion able to make the condition at
lines 08, 12 and 17 satisfied with not valid values. Thus, the claim simply follows by
Lemma 3 and Theorem 2. ✷Theorem 4
7 Pcv and Phash Protocols for a Regular Register whenDs ≥ Gs
In the following, we show how to modify the protocol to get θ ≥ 12 , when Ds ≥ Gs.
In particular, we propose two possible extensions: the first using a probabilistic collab-
orative detection at the client side (introducing a cost in terms of number of messages
needed to run the detection) and the second using a kind of fingerprint to prevent servers
misbehavior (introducing a computational cost).
A collaborative detection protocol Pcv. The collaborative detection involves all the
clients in the detection process and exploits the fact that the last writer remains in the
system and it is always able to identify a faulty server. The basic idea is to look for a
write witness (i.e., the writer) each time that a reader is not able to decide about the
correctness of a value. This solution allows to identify malicious server and to decide
and return always a correct value. However, considering that (i) we want to decouple as
much as possible servers and client, (ii) this collaborative approach has a cost in terms
of messages and (iii) to force rational servers to behave correctly it is sufficient to get
θ ≥ 12 (according to Lemma 3), then we use this collaborative approach only with a
given probability. More in details, in Pcv protocol, when a reader does not collect the
same value from all servers it flips a coin to decide if running the collaborative detection
or not. If the outcome is 1, then it broadcasts to all the other clients the timestamps col-
lected during the read operation and waits that some writer acknowledge them. When a
client receives a check timestamp request, it checks if it corresponds to its last written
value and if so, it replies with such a value so that the reader can double-check infor-
mation provided by servers. If there is no match between values and timestamps, then
clients are able to detect a faulty server and exclude it from the computation.
The introduction of this probabilistic step in the protocol increases the value of θ to 12 .
As a consequence, following Lemma 3, any rational server will decide to behave cor-
rectly to avoid to be detected.
A fingerprint-based detection protocolPhash. Let us recall that the basic idea behind
the detection process is to include inside reply messages (i.e., write acknowledgements
or read replies) “enough” information to verify the correctness of the provided informa-
tion. In particular, in protocol P , servers are required to acknowledge write operations
by sending back the corresponding timestamp so that each client is always aware about
it and the writer is able to verify that no bad timestamps are sent to clients.
In protocol Phash, the basic idea is to extend P by including another information
i.e., a fingerprint of the value and its timestamp (e.g., its hash), in the write message and
in its acknowledgement so that it is always possible for a client to check that servers
are replying correctly. More in details, when a client writes, it computes the hash of
the value and its corresponding timestamp and attaches such fingerprint to the message.
In such way (as for P) when servers acknowledge a write, they send back the correct
fingerprint to all clients. Having such information, all clients are potentially able to de-
tect locally if values collected during a read operation are never written values (this
can be simply done by computing the hash of the message and compare it with the one
received during the last write). However, as in the case of Pcv, this detection has a cost
and, to get θ ≥ 12 it is sufficient that this is done with a certain probability. Thus, when a
reader does not collect the same value from all servers, it flips a coin and if the outcome
is 1 then it computes the hash of the messages it delivered and compares them with
the hashes it knows to be associated to a specific timestamp. The introduction of this
step is enough to get θ = 12 and to prevent rational servers deviating from the protocol.
Notice that, as for Pcv, the employment of the random coin has a twofold purpose: (i)
to provide a solution for Ds ≥ Gs, for which it is enough to have θ ≥
1
2 and (ii) to
avoid to always perform the costly detection operation.
Trade offs. Figure 5 shows a qualitative comparison of the three proposed protocols
in terms of message complexity and computational cost. In particular, we compare the
cost of the protocols both in presence and absence of a server attack (i.e., when the de-
tection is necessary or not). As we can see, P requires the highest number of messages
and such number does not depend on the real need of doing detection but it is rather re-
quired to mask the type of operation that a client is doing and to make indistinguishable
real read messages from dummy ones. Concerning its computational cost, it is constant
since it does not depend on the message size.
In Pcv it is possible to save the dummy read messages as we do not need anymore
to mask the message pattern but we need to pay the cost of the collaborative detec-
tion, if it is needed. In fact, if a reader is not able to decide a value, it needs to send
messages to contact all the other clients (higher message complexity in case of server
misbehaviour). Concerning the computational cost, it is not affected by the detection.
Conversely, Phash exhibits the dual behaviour: message complexity is not affected by
server misbehaviour but the computational cost is impacted by the need of detection.
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Fig. 5. Qualitative analysis of protocols with respect to their message complexity (left figure) and
computational complexity (right figure). For the message complexity we consider a system where
the number of servers is n = 10 and the number of clients is c = 1000. For the computational
complexity we consider the cost with respect to the message sizem.
Thus, we can conclude saying thatP is a pessimistic protocol and is the most expen-
sive one but it allows to maintains clients and servers completely decoupled. Contrarily,
Pcv and Phash are optimistic as they perform lightweight operations and, if needed,
they perform an heavy detection (with a high message cost in the case of Pcv and a
high computational cost in case of Phash).
Sketch of Pcv andPhash correctness
Pcv has not variations with respect to P concerning the write and read operations (the
detection procedure is removed from the write operation). Thus the algorithm is proved
to work. Concerning the detection part we have that when a clients fails to read, then
it asks to other clients to reach the last writing one that replies with the correct value.
Thus the reading clients is able to detected servers acting in a malicious way. Since the
detection procedure is run depending on the outcome of a random bit then θ = 12 . Thus
if Ds > Gs then (4) holds then Pcv implements a regular register with only 1 alive
honest server.
Phash has not variations with respect to P concerning the write and read operations
(the detection procedure is removed from the write operation). Thus the algorithm is
proved to work. The difference with P is that the detection procedure slightly modifies
the write operation. Each time a new value is written, the hash is computed and spread
along with the timestamp. The proof of that directly follows generalizing Lemma 6.
When a clients fails to read then it performs the hash of the delivered replies to com-
pare them to the one it knows to be associated to the related timestamp. Thus the reading
clients is able to detected servers acting in a malicious way. Since the detection proce-
dure is run depending on the outcome of a random bit then θ = 12 , ifDs > Gs then (4)
holds then Pcv implements a regular register with only 1 alive honest server.
8 Conclusion
This paper addresses the problem of building a regular register in a distributed system
where clients are anonymous and servers maintaining the register state may be rational
malicious processes. We have modelled our problem as a two-parties Bayesian game
and we designed distributed protocols able to reach the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and
to emulate a regular register when the loss in case of detection is greater than the gain
obtained from the deviation (i.e.Ds > Gs). To the best of our knowledge, our protocols
are the first register protocols working in the absence of knowledge on the number of
compromised replicas.
The protocols rely on the following assumptions: (i) rational malicious servers act
independently and do not form a coalition, (ii) the system is synchronous, (iii) clients
are anonymous and (iv) write operations are serialised.
As future works, we are investigating how to solve the same problem under weaker
synchrony assumption or in the case an attacker controls a coalition of processes. Ad-
dressing these points is actually far from be trivial. Considering a fully asynchronous
system, in fact, makes impossible to use our punishment mechanism as clients are not
able to distinguish alive but silent servers from those crashed. Additionally, when the
attacker is able to compromise and control a coalition of processes, the model provided
in this paper is no more adeguate and we are studying if and how it is possible to define
a Bayesian Coalitional Game [12] for our problem and if an equilibrium can be reached
in this case.
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